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Attorney Fees: Does CERCLA Include
Them as Part of a Private Cost
Recovery Action?
RUSSELL B. MORGAN*
As the number of private parties forced to address hazardous
waste sites on their land increases,' the concern about transaction
costs2 incurred by these persons," some of which have little or no
culpability for the contamination, has gained increased recogni-
tion as well. One specific area of concern is the statutory authority
provided by the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Com-
pensation, and Liability, Act (CERCLA) for private parties to re-
cover attorney fees incurred in private cost recovery actions.' This
concern has evidenced itself through the split of authority that ex-
ists among the federal circuit courts' and district courts.'
* Senior staff member, JOURNAL OF NATURAL RESOURCES & ENVIRONMENTAL LAW;
J.D., Class of 1994, University of Kentucky; B.A., 1990, Western Kentucky University.
See UNITED STATES GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE. GAO/RCED-88-44,
SUPERFUND: EXTENT OF NATION'S POTENTIAL HAZARDOUS WASTE PROBLEM STILL UN-
KNOWN (1987)(estimating the number of hazardous waste sites to be between 130,000 and
425,000).
1 See Janet Morris Jones, Comment, Attorney Fees: CERCLA Private Recovery Ac-
tiOns, 10 PACE ENVTL. L. REV. 393 n.9 (1992)(citing J.P. ACTON & L.S. DIXON,
SUPERFUND AND TRANSACTION COSTS: THE EXPERIENCES OF INSURERS AND THE VET?
(1992)); William N. Hedeman et al., Superfund Transaction Costs: A Critical Perspective
on the Superfund Liability Scheme, 21 Envtl. L. Rep. (Envtl. L. Inst.) 10413 (July, 1991).
1 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980
(CERCLA) defines "person" to include "an individual, firm, corporation, association, part-
nership, consortium, joint venture, commercial entity, United States Government, State,
municipality, commission, political subdivision of a State, or any interstate body." CER-
CLA § 101, 42 U.S.C. § 9601(21)(1988)(outlining costs involved in Superfund process).
- 42 U.S.C. §§ 9601-9675.
' Compare FMC Corp. v. Aero Indus., 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993) (holding pri-
vate plaintiffs can recover attorney fees incurred in nonlitigation removal related activities,
but not for litigation to recover costs); Donahey v. Bogle, 987 F.2d 1250, (6th Cir. 1993)
(holding attorney fees recoverable); General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial Automation
Sys., 920 F.2d 1415 (8th Cir. 1990) (holding attorney fees recoverable), cert denied, I I 
S.Ct. 1390 (1991); with In re Hemingway Transport, 993 F.2d 915 (1st Cir. 1993) (hold-
ing attorney fees not recoverable); Stanton Road Associates v. Lohrey Enterprises, 984
F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993) (holding attorney fees not recoverable).
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This note provides an analysis of the propriety of awarding
attorney fees in light of the express statutory authority provided
by CERCLA. Following a brief discussion of CERCLA's purpose
and structure, this note analyzes the statutory language applicable
to government and private cost recovery actions which has created
the controversy over the appropriateness of awarding attorney
fees. This note will then discuss the common law rules relevant to
an award of attorney fees. Finally, this note reviews the three ap-
proaches followed by the circuit courts and the rationale for each
approach. This note suggests the approach that should be followed
and advocates that an amendment to CERCLA explicitly allowing
attorney fees is required to effectively carry out the purpose of the
Act.
I. HISTORY, PURPOSE, AND STRUCTURE OF CERCLA
Congress enacted CERCLA in 1980 in response to the in-
creased discovery of incidents involving improper disposal of haz-
ardous substances.' Although statutory authorities designed to
protect public health and the environment already existed,' Con-
8 Compare Anspec Co. v. Johnson Controls, Inc., 788 F. Supp. 951 (E.D. Mich. 1992)
(holding that attorney fees are not recoverable in a private cost recovery action under
CERCLA); Sante Fe Pacific Realty Corp. v. United States, 780 F. Supp. 687 (E.D. Cal.
1991) (holding attorney fees not recoverable); Leonard Partnership v. Town of Chenango,
779 F. Supp 223 (N.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding attorney fees not recoverable); Pease & Cur-
ren Ref., Inc. v. Spectrolab, Inc., 744 F. Supp. 945, 949-52 (C.D. Cal. 1990) (holding
attorney fees not recoverable); United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D.
Okla. 1990) rev'd and remanded on other grounds, 982 F.2d 1436 (holding attorney fees
not recoverable); Fallowfield Dev. Corp. v. Strunk, 766 F. Supp. 335, 337-38 (E.D. Pa.
1991)(holding attorney fees not recoverable); Mesiti v. Microdot, Inc., 739 F. Supp. 57,
62-63 (D.N.H. 1990) (holding attorney fees not recoverable); Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706
F. Supp. 145, 149 (DR.I. 1989) (holding attorney fees not recoverable); T & E Industries
v. Safety Light Corp., 680 F. Supp. 696, 708 (D.N.J. 1988) (holding attorney fees not
recoverable); BCW Assoc, v, Occidental Chem. Corp., No. 85-5947, 1988 WL 102641, at
*23 (E.D. Pa. 1988) (holding attorney fees not recoverable); with Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft
Co., 759 F. Supp. 692 (D. Kan. 1991) (holding attorney fees recoverable); Gopher Oil Co.
v. Union Oil Co., 757 F. Supp. 998 (D. Minn. 1991) (holding attorney fees recoverable);
Shapiro v. Alexanderson, 741 F. Supp. 472, 480 (S.D.N.Y. 1990) (holding attorney fees
recoverable).
7 Michael P. Healy, Direct Liability for Hazardous Substance Cleanups Under CER-
CLA: A Comprehensive Approach, 42 CASE W RES. L. REV. 65, 68-69 (1992)(citing three
incidents which "sparked interest in and support for" CERCLA: the Love Canal in New
York, the Valley of the Drums in Kentucky, and James River ketone discharges in
Virginia).
8 Resource Conservation and Recovery Act of 1976 §§ 101-704, 42 U.S.C. §§ 6901-




gress perceived a need for further protection and therefore pro-
vided for the immediate, large-scale response to the dangers of
hazardous waste sites.9
CERCLA was enacted with two overriding purposes: (1) to
ensure and assist in the prompt cleanup of hazardous substances;
and (2) to require those parties responsible for the contamination
to compensate for the cleanups or clean up the site themselves.10
However, because of the great haste with which CERCLA was
enacted, a number of ambiguities exist. Thus, a great deal of liti-
gation has occurred in determining how these goals are to be
accomplished."
CERCLA provides the government with several mechanisms
of enforcement to ensure immediate and effective cleanup of haz-
ardous waste sites. 2 The government may require a private party
to clean up waste sites,"3 or it may undertake the cleanup itself,"'
I Healy, supra note 7, at 68.
'5 See H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th-Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 3, at 15 (1986), reprinted in
1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3038 ("CERCLA has two goals: (1) to provide for clean-up if a haz-
ardous substance is released into the environment or if such release is threatened, and (2)
to hold responsible parties liable for the costs of these clean-ups."); Christopher D. Knopf,
Breaking New Ground: Recovery of Transaction Costs in Private CERCLA Cost-Recovery
Actions, 28 WILLIAMETTE L. REV. 495, 496 (1992).
" See Kanad S. Virk, Comment, General Electric Co. v. Litton Automation Systems,
Inc.: Are Attorney Fees Recoverable in CERCLA Private Cost Recovery Actions?, 75
MINN. L. REV. 1541, 1547 n. 38 (1991).
12 See infra notes 14-16 and accompanying text.
1s CERCLA § 106(a), 42 U.S.C. § 9606(a) (1988) provides:
In addition to any other action taken by a State or local government, when
the President determines that there may be an imminent and substantial en-
dangerment to the public health or welfare or the environment because of an
actual or threatened release of a hazardous substance from a facility, he may
require the Attorney General of the United States to secure such relief as
may be necessary to abate such danger or threat, and the district court of the
United States in the district in which the threat occurs shall have jurisdiction
to grant such relief as the public interest and the equities of the case may
require. The President may also, after notice to the affected State, take
other action under this section including, but not limited to. issuing such
orders as may be necessary to protect public health and welfare and the
environment. (Emphasis added)
1' 42 U.S.C. § 9604(a) provides in pertinent pars:
(1) Whenever (A) any hazardous substance is released or there is a substan-
tial threat of such a release into the environment, or (B) there is a release or
substantial threat of release into the environment of any pollutant or contam-
inant which may present an imminent and substantial danger to the public
health or welfare, the President is authorized to act, consistent with the na-
tional contingency plan, to remove or arrange for the removal of, and provide
for remedial action relating to such hazardous substance, pollutant, or con-
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using resources from the Hazardous Substances Trust Fund'" to
finance its efforts. Moreover, the government may recoup the costs
of the cleanup by bringing an action against the responsible par-
ties. 6 Persons subject to these government actions, also known as
potential responsible parties, include owners or operators of a site,
both past and present, and transporters or generators who contrib-
taminant at any time (including'its removal from any contaminated natural
resource), or take any other response measure consistent with the national
contingency plan which the President deems necessary to protect the public
health or welfare or the environment.
Id.
'B Hazardous Substances Superfund is established in 26 U.S.C. § 9507 (1988), which
provides:
There is established in the Treasury of the United States a trust fund to be
known as the "Hazardous Substance Superfund" (hereinafter in this section
referred to as the "Superfund"), consisting of such amounts as may be-
(1) appropriated to the Superfund as provided in this section, (2) ap-
propriated to the Superfund pursuant to section 517(b) of the
Superfund Revenue Act of 1986, or (3) credited to the Superfund as
provided in section 9602(b).
id.
16 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1) provides in pertinent part:
[T]he President may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engi-
neering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem
necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the
costs thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this chapter.
id.
Also, 42 U.S.C § 9607(a)(4)(A) provides:
[Covered persons] shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the United
States Government or a State or an Indian tribe not inconsistent with
the national contingency plan.
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uted to the contamination.17 These persons are subject to joint,
several, 8 and strict liability.19
CERCLA also allows private parties to clean up hazardous
waste sites and then seek recovery of "response costs" from re-
sponsible parties.20 To recover, a private plaintiff must prove that:
(1) the defendant was a covered person as defined in section
9607(a); (2) there was a release or a threatened release of a haz-
ardous substance; (3) the plaintiff incurred necessary response
costs; and (4) the response costs were incurred consistently with
the National Contingency Plan."' A private plaintiff is similarly
situated to the government except the plaintiff does not have a
statutory injunction remedy, cannot recover punitive damages,
cannot seek damages for harm to natural resources, and must
have acted consistently with the NCP.22 In addition to indemnifi-
11 42 U.S.C. 9607(a) holds the following parties liable for response costs, subject only
to defenses set forth in subsection (b) of this section:
(1) the owner and operator of a vessel or a facility, (2) any person who at the
time of disposal of any hazardous substance owned or operated any facility
at which such hazardous substances were disposed of, (3) any person who by
contract, agreement, or otherwise arranged for disposal or treatment, or ar-
ranged with a transporter for transport for disposal or treatment, of hazard-
ous substances owned or possessed by such person, by any other party or
entity, at any facility or incineration vessel owned or operated by another
party or entity and containing such hazardous substances, and (4) any person
who accepts or accepted any hazardous substances for transport to disposal
or treatment facilities, incineration vessels or sites selected by such person,
from which there is a release, or a threatened release which causes the incur-
rence of response costs, of a hazardous substance ....
Id.
'a United States v. Chem-Dyne Corp., 572 F. Supp. 802, 808 (S.D. Ohio 1983) (hold-
ing that joint and several liability applies to CERCLA). This decision was adopted by
Congress in the 1986 Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA),
H.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., 2d Sess., pt. 2, at 79-80 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2861-62 ("nothing in this bill is intended to change the application of
the uniform federal rule of joint and several liability enunciated by the Chem-Dyne
court").
"' Strict liability is not expressly imposed in CERCLA. However, § 9601(32) pro-
vides that "liability" and "liable" are to be construed as the standard of liability applicable
to the Federal Water Pollution Control Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1321(1988), which has been
interpreted to impose strict liability. See, e.g., Steuart Transp. Co. v. Allied Towing Corp.,
596 F.2d 609, 613 (4th Cir. 1979). For a discussion of the strict liability standard under
CERCLA, see Healy, supra note 7, at 86-87.
20 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a)(I)-(4)(b).
21 42 U.S.C. § 9607(a). The National Contingency Plan (NCP) is established at 40
C.F.R. pt. 300. It provides specific requirements that must be followed for a private party
or the government to recover.
12 Daniel Riesel, Private Hazardous Substance Litigation, C778 A.L.I-A.B.A.
COURSE OF STUDY 59, 66-67 (1992).
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cation, a private plaintiff may seek contribution through a private
action. 3
II. PROVISIONS RELEVANT IN ASSESSING THE AVAILABILITY OF
AN AWARD FOR ATTORNEY FEES INCURRED IN PRIVATE COST
RECOVERY ACTIONS
The controversy over the ability of a private plaintiff to re-
cover attorney fees arises from the statutory provisions providing
for recovery of cost actions. Section 9607(a)(4) provides for gov-
ernment and private cost recovery actions as follows:
[Covered persons] shall be liable for-
(A) all costs of removal or remedial action incurred by the
United States Government or a State or an Indian tribe
not inconsistent with the national contingency plan;
(B) any other necessary costs of response incurred by any
other person consistent with the national contingency
plan;"4
These provisions must be read in conjunction with the definition of
response in section 9601(25) which provides:
The terms "respond" or "response" mean remove, removal, rem-
edy, and remedial action, all such terms (including the terms
"removal" and "remedial action") include enforcement activities
related thereto.
SARA modified this definition by adding the phrase "include en-
forcement activities."
The legislative history of SARA provides some insight into
the meaning of "enforcement activities." The House Energy and
Commerce Committee made the following comment: "[S]ection
[9601] also modifies the definition of 'response action' to include
' 42 U.S.C. § 9613 (f)(1) provides in pertinent part:
Any person may seek contribution from any other person who is liable or
potentially liable under section 9607(a) of this title, during or following any
civil action under section 9606 of this title or under section 9607(a) of this
title .... In resolving contribution claims, the court may allocate response
costs among liable parties using such equitable factors as the court deter-
mines are appropriate ....
Id.
2 For a discussion of the difference in the statutory language of these provisions, see
Heather M. Harvey, Note, The Availability of Attorneys' Fees as a Necessary Cost of




related enforcement activities. The change will confirm the [Envi-
ronmental Protection Agency's] authority to recover costs for en-
forcement actions taken against responsible parties. "5
Virtually no dispute exists as to the government's ability to
recover attorney fees as a cost of removal. 28 However, a private
plaintiff's right to recover attorney fees remains in serious dispute.
III. THE AMERICAN RULE
While England historically has allowed the prevailing party
in litigation to recover attorney fees, the rule in the United States
is that "the prevailing litigant is ordinarily not entitled to collect
reasonable attorneys' fees from the loser" (the American Rule).
27
In Alyeska Pipeline Service Co. v. Wilderness Society, the United
States Supreme Court addressed the appropriateness of awarding
attorney fees to environmental groups who had successfully sought
to enjoin the Secretary of the Interior from issuing right-of-way
and special land-use permits to a consortium of oil companies who
intended to build a pipeline to transport oil across Alaska. The
environmental groups alleged that the permits and right-of-ways
violated section 28 of the Mineral Leasing Act of 19208 and the
National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.29 A preliminary in-
junction was granted by the federal district court."0 Subsequently,
the district court dissolved the preliminary injunction, denied a
permanent injunction, and dismissed the complaint. However, the
appellate court reversed and granted the permanent injunction. 1
The appellate court then considered the environmental
groups' request for an award of attorney fees. The court granted
the attorney fees based on a "private attorney general" theory,
stating that the environmental groups had acted to vindicate im-
1 HR REP No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 66-67 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2848.
" See United States v. Hardage, 750 F. Supp. 1460, 1511 (W.D. Okla. 1990); United
States v. South Carolina Recycling and Disposal, Inc., 653 F. Supp. 984, 1009 (D.S.C.
1984)(holding attorney fees recoverable); United States v. Northeastern Pharmaceutical &
Chem. Co., 579 F. Supp. 823, 851 (W.D. Mo. 1984)(holding attorney fees recoverable).
" Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 247 (1975); see
Fleischmann Distilling Corp. v. Maier Brewing Co., 386 U.S. 714 (1967).
2' 30 U.S.C. § 185 (1920).
29 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-4370d (1969).
o Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, No. 928-70, 1972 WL 20824 (D.D.C. Aug. 15, 1972).
3' Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 479 F.2d 842 (D.C. 1973), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 917
(1973).
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portant statutory rights of all citizens.3" The court required Aly-
eska to pay one-half of the full award of attorney fees."
The Supreme Court reversed. 3' Following a thorough histori-
cal analysis of the American Rule and its exceptions, the Court
refused to judicially create a private attorney general exception.3 5
The Court recognized that "absent [a] statute or [an] enforceable
contract, litigants pay their own attorneys' fees." 36
The American Rule was reaffirmed in Runyon v. McCrary,
wherein the Court stated that "the law of the United States, but
for a few well-recognized exceptions . . . has always been that
absent explicit congressional authorization, attorneys' fees are not
a recoverable cost of litigation," and more than "generalized com-
mands" in a statute are required for a court to award attorney
fees."'
Three well-established common law exceptions to the Ameri-
can Rule exist. First, a trustee of a fund or property, or a party
preserving or recovering a fund for the benefit of others in addi-
tion to himself, may recover his costs and expenses from the
fund." Second, a party may recover attorney fees from his oppo-
nent when the opponent has acted in willful disobedience of a
court order.3 9 The final exception requires a losing party who has
acted "in bad faith, vexatiously, wantonly, or for oppressive rea-
sons" to pay the prevailing party's attorney fees.' In addition,
Congress has created more than one hundred statutory excep-
tions. 1 If attorney fees are to be awarded under CERCLA, au-
thority must be found to have been provided explicitly in the
statute.'
2
32 Wilderness Soc'y v. Morton, 495 F.2d 1026 (D.C. 1974).
33 Id. at 1036.
" Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240 (1975).
35 Id. at 269-71.
36 Id. at 257 (citing F.D. Rich Co. v. United States ex rel. Industrial Lumber Co.,
417 U.S. 116, 126-31 (1974)).
37 427 U.S. 160, 186-87 (1976).
11 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 257; Trustees v. Greenough, 105 U.S. 527 (1881).
3, Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258 (citations omitted); Toledo Scale Co. v. Computing Scale
Co., 261 U.S. 399, 426-28 (1923).
40 Alyeska, 421 U.S. at 258-59; see FED. R. Civ. P. 11; F.D. Rich Co. v. Industrial
Lumber Co., 417 U.S. 116, 129 (1974).
-2 See Marek v. Chesny, 473 U.S. I, 44-51 (1985)(Brennan J., dissenting)(providing
the statutory exceptions to the American Rule prohibiting attorney fees).
"2 The statutory exception must be discerned from the plain meaning of the statute.
Two approaches exist in determining the plain meaning of a statute: the purist plain mean-
ing approach and the quasi plain meaning approach. The purist plain meaning approach,
[VOL. 9:491
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IV. APPROACHES FOLLOWED IN EVALUATING ALLOWANCE OF
ATTORNEY FEES UNDER CERCLA
A. Recovery Specifically Permitted under CERCLA
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals was the first appellate
court to address a private party's ability to recover attorney fees
under CERCLA. In General Electric Co. v. Litton Industrial
Automation Systems, Inc.,4" General Electric filed suit against
Litton seeking to recover response costs it had incurred in cleaning
up land it owned and had purchased from Litton in 1970. Litton
was the successor corporation of Royal-McBee who, from 1959 to
1962, dumped cyanide-based electroplating wastes, sludge, and
other pollutants onto a forty-acre tract of land. The district court
held for General Electric, ordering Litton to pay more than
$940,000 as reimbursement for response costs incurred and more
than $419,000 in attorney fees and expenses."
After affirming the district court's decision on the necessity of
the response costs incurred by General Electric45 due to its consis-
tent following of the NCP requirements, 46 the appellate court ad-
dressed the appropriateness of the award of attorney fees. The
court, relying on the Ninth Circuit's decision in Cadillac
Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chemical Co.,47 stated that
"[a]ttorney fees and expenses necessarily are incurred in this kind
of enforcement activity and it would strain the statutory language
to the breaking point to read them out of the 'necessary costs' that
section 9607(a)(4)(B) allows private parties to recover. ' 1" Conse-
quently, the court concluded that CERCLA, with a sufficient de-
gree of explicitness, authorized the recovery of attorney fees and
expenses by private parties. The court further declared that its
advocated by Justice Antonin Scalia, examines only the language of the statute. The quasi
plain meaning approach discerns congressional intent by examining the legislative history.
See Jones, supra note 2; see also Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate
Decision and the Rules or Canons About How Statutes are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L.
REV. 395 (1950).
" 920 F.2d 1415, 1416 (8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1990), reh'g
denied I1I S. Ct. 1697 (1991).
" General Electric Co. v. Litton Business Sys., Inc., 715 F. Supp. 949 (W.D. Mo.
1989).
" General Electric, 920 F.2d at 1419.
I Id. at 1420.
41 840 F.2d 691, 694 (9th Cir. 1988) (holding that private cost recovery actions are
included within the scope of "enforcement activities").
8 General Electric Co., 920 F.2d at 1422.
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conclusion was "consistent with two of the main purposes of CER-
CLA-prompt cleanup of hazardous waste sites and imposition of
all cleanup costs on the responsible party" and that "[tihese pur-
poses would be undermined if a non-polluter . . . were forced to
absorb the litigation costs . ... "I'
This decision has been criticized as constituting an improper
application of the American Rule.5 0 The General Electric court
improperly looked to policy in its analysis. Further, the court did
not consider the legislative history of section 9601(25)" 1 in making
its determination.6
2
Nonetheless, in Donahey v. Bogle,5" the Sixth Circuit Court
of Appeals agreed with the decision in General Electric. In sup-
port of its conclusion, the court quoted the rationale set forth in
Bolin v. Cessna Aircraft Co.:"
By providing private parties with a federal cause of action for
the recovery of necessary expenses in the cleanup of hazardous
wastes, Congress intended § [9607] as a powerful incentive for
these parties to expend their own funds initially without waiting
for the responsible persons to take action .... The court can
conceive of no surer method to defeat this purpose than to re-
quire private parties to shoulder the financial burden of the very
litigation that is necessary to recover these costs."
" id.
1o Virk, supra note 11, at 1562.
" See supra note 11 and accompanying text.
s2 One commentator has said that this is an example of the quasi plain meaning ap-
proach to statutory construction. Jones, supra note 2; see also note 46 and accompanying
text. However, the legislative history of §9601(25) provides no support for the conclusion
that Congress intended a recovery of attorney fees. Moreover, the General Electric court
did not consider this in its decision, but based its opinion solely on policy. General Electric
Co., 920 F.2d 1415. Even under the quasi plain meaning approach, a fair reading of the
language of both the statue and the legislative history provides no support for a finding that
Congress created a statutory exception.
53 987 F.2d 1250 (6th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 114 S. Ct. 636 (1993).
759 F. Supp. 692, 710 (D. Kan. 1991) (citations omitted).
Donahey, 987 F.2d at 1256.
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B. Statutory Language Does Not Explicitly Provide for Attor-
ney Fees as Enforcement Activities or as Necessary Costs of
Response
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Stanton Road Associ-
ates v. Lohrey Enterprises"6 concluded that a strict application of
the American Rule prohibits an award of attorney fees in private
cost recovery actions. Consequently, the court reversed the district
court's award of $126,198 in attorney fees. 57 To reach this conclu-
sion, the court was required to explain its holding in Cadillac
Fairview, wherein it held that private cost recovery actions were
enforcement actions that did not require a prior government ac-
tion to be pursued. 8 In General Electric, the Eighth Circuit relied
on Cadillac Fairview for its authority that private cost recovery
actions were "enforcement activities."59 The Stanton Road court
distinguished its decision in Cadillac Fairview by simply recogniz-
ing that its decision in that case did not include a determination
on the viability of an award of attorney fees.60
Thereafter, the court determined that the words "enforce-
ment activities" did not provide explicit authorization for an
award of attorney fees. The court based this conclusion on the fact
that Congress had demonstrated its ability to create an express
statutory exception to the American Rule in other statutes, specif-
ically sections 9604(b) and 9659(f) of CERCLA. 1 Moreover, the
court relied on the dispute that exists among district courts ad-
56 984 F.2d 1015 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. granted, 114 S. Ct. 633 (1993), cert. dis-
missed, 114 S. Ct. 652 (1993).
I' ld. at 1016.
Cadillac Fairview/California, Inc. v. Dow Chem. Co., 840 F.2d 691, 693 (9th Cir.
1988)(citing Wickland Oil Terminals v. Asarco, Inc., 792 F.2d 887, 892 (9th Cir. 1986)).
" General Electric Co. v. Litton Indus. Automation Sys., Inc., 920 F.2d 1415, 1422
(8th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 499 U.S. 937 (1990), reh'g denied, Ill S_ Ct. 1697 (1991).
80 Stanton Road Assoc., 984 F.2d at 1018.
Il ld. at 1019. Section 104 of CERCLA provides in pertinent part:
[Tlhe President may undertake such planning, legal, fiscal, economic, engi-
neering, architectural, and other studies or investigations as he may deem
necessary or appropriate to plan and direct response actions, to recover the
costs thereof, and to enforce the provisions of this chapter,
CERCLA § 104(b)(1), 42 U.S.C. § 9604(b)(1)(1988). Similarly, 42 U.S.C § 9659(f)
provides in pertinent part:
The court, in issuing any final order in any action brought pursuant to this
section, may award costs of litigation (including reasonable attorney and ex-
pert witness fees) to the prevailing or the substantially prevailing party
whenever the court determines such an award is appropriate-
42 U.S.C. §9659(f).
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dressing this issue as evidence of an absence of express
authorization.62
Following this analysis, the court criticized the Eighth Cir-
cuit's decision in General Electric as improperly relying on the
policy under!ying CERCLA to imply authorization for an award
of attorney fees.6" The court emphasized that the American Rule
prohibits any implication of authorization for attorney fees, and
concluded that the words "necessary costs of response" did not
provide any express authority. The court stated that it would be
required to read words into CERCLA to uphold the district
court's award of attorney fees.64
The First Circuit followed this approach in In re Hemingway
Transport, Inc."n The court added further support for a disallow-
ance of attorney fees by recognizing that Congress did not con-
sider or include an attorney fees amendment applicable to section
9607(a)(4)(B) private cost recovery actions when it enacted
SARA in 1986.66 Moreover, the court refused to imply such au-
thority, concluding that the task was "one for the legislative
venue."
67
This approach is harsh, but accurate. "Necessary costs of re-
sponse" read in conjunction with "enforcement activities" simply
does not provide explicit authority for a court to award attorney
fees. Moreover, the only legislative history of the statute, the re-
port of the House Energy and Commerce Committee,6 6 does not
evidence Congress's intent to provide private parties with an ac-
tion to recover attorney fees. The legislative history of SARA
states, with specificity, that the inclusion of "enforcement activi-
ties" allows the EPA to recover all its costs in enforcement ac-
tions.6 9 Consequently, a negative inference can be made that Con-
gress did not deem attorney fees a recoverable expense incurred in
enforcement activities.
" Stanton Road Assoc., 984 F.2d at 1018.
13 Id. at 1019-20.
61 Id. at 1020.
6- 993 F.2d 915, 935 (Ist Cir. 1993), cert. dismissed, 114 S. Ct. 303 (1993).
66 Id. at 934 (citing Dedham Water Co., Inc. v. Cumberland Farms Dairy, Inc., 972
F.2d 453, 461 (Ist Cir. 1992)); see Regan v. Cherry Corp., 706 F. Supp. 145, 149 (D.R.I.
1989).
67 In re Hemingway Transp., Inc., 993 F.2d at 934.
SH.R. REP. No. 253, 99th Cong., Ist Sess., pt. 1, at 66-67 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 2835, 2848.
" See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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C. Nonlitigation Removal-Related Attorney Fees Distinguished
from Attorney Fees Incurred in Litigation
The Tenth Circuit identified a third approach in FMC Corp.
v. Aero Industries, Inc." In that case, the court considered the
plaintiff's claims for both attorney fees incurred in response cost
litigation and those incurred in nonlitigation removal-related ac-
tivities. Distinguishing the two as different claims, the court con-
cluded that the former were not recoverable. The court stated
"[w]e simply cannot agree with those courts that find an explicit
authorization for the award of litigation fees from the fact that
response costs include related enforcement activities. '71 The court
acknowledged the policies in support of an award of these attorney
fees, but concluded that "[t]he desirability of a fee-shifting provi-
sion cannot substitute for the express authorization mandated by
the Supreme Court [in Alyeska Pipeline Service Co.]."72
In response to the plaintiff's latter claim, however, the court
reached an opposite conclusion. The attorney fees in question were
incurred in carrying out the EPA's order and included activities
such as negotiating and drafting contracts for the removal action
and preparing the work plan approved by the EPA. 73 The court
declared that these fees were exempted from the American
Rule.74 Consequently, the court held that these costs could be in-
cluded as necessary costs of response, and remanded the case for a
determination of which fees were necessary to the containment
and cleanup of the hazardous wastes on the site.75
This approach reaches a logical conclusion. Attorney fees in-
curred by a party in cleaning up a hazardous waste site are not
per se unrecoverable. Certainly legal assistance is always going to
be required in carrying out the cleanup. Therefore, courts should
classify the two forms of attorney fees incurred by private parties
as was done by the FMC Corp. court.
70 998 F.2d 842 (10th Cir. 1993).
11 Id. at 847.
" Id.
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CONCLUSION
The approach identified by the FMC Corp. court is the most
reasonable of the three current approaches. The phrase "necessary
costs of response" does not constitute an express exception to the
American Rule. Moreover, as can be discerned from other stat-
utes, Congress is aware of the demand for attorney fees and has
demonstrated its ability to provide for such fees. Further, Con-
gress had ample opportunity to provide an express exception to the
American Rule when it enacted SARA. In addition, SARA pro-
vides no support for the General Electric court's conclusion but
only includes EPA activities as being encompassed within the
phrase "enforcement activities."
Although the policies applied in General Electric are support-
ive of CERCLA, the American Rule requires that these consider-
ations be left to congressional discretion."' However, Congress, in
any future revision to CERCLA, should consider these policy ar-
guments and amend CERCLA to provide for an award of attor-
ney fees in private cost recovery actions. Such an amendment
would provide private plaintiffs with the incentive to clean up haz-
ardous waste sites without any hesitation.
Finally, the distinction recognized by the FMC Corp. court's
conclusion should be followed by district courts. The attorney fees
incurred by private parties in carrying out the cleanup fall within
the necessary costs of response imagined by Congress. Congress is
cognizant of the private parties' need for legal assistance as well
as the transaction costs a party will incur in negotiating and car-
rying out large cleanup contracts. Moreover, these types of con-
tracts are not of the type involved in most private parties' ordinary
course of business; thus, their need for legal assistance is even
greater. Consequently, it is reasonable for one to conclude that
Congress intended that these transaction costs be included as a
necessary cost of response.
" Alyeska Pipeline Serv. Co. v. Wilderness Soc'y, 421 U.S. 240, 269 (1975).
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